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Post-processing is a significant step in quantum key distribution(QKD), which is used for cor-
recting the quantum-channel noise errors and distilling identical corrected keys between two distant
legitimate parties. Efficient error reconciliation protocol, which can lead to an increase in the se-
cure key generation rate, is one of the main performance indicators of QKD setups. In this paper,
we propose a multi-low-density parity-check codes based reconciliation scheme, which can provide
remarkable perspectives for highly efficient information reconciliation. With testing our approach
through data simulation, we show that the proposed scheme combining multi-syndrome-based error
rate estimation allows a more accurate estimation about the error rate as compared with random
sampling and single-syndrome estimation techniques before the error correction, as well as a sig-
nificant increase in the efficiency of the procedure without compromising security and sacrificing
reconciliation efficiency.
INTRODUCTION
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) is a class of pro-
tocols where the two separated users, Alice and Bob,
can share identical secret keys which are secure from the
eavesdropper (Eve) [1]. Since it provides unconditional
security guaranteed by laws of quantum mechanics [2],
QKD has attracted wide attention and many advanced
works have been published over recent years [3–6]. Gen-
erally, a QKD protocol can be divided into quantum and
classical parts. In the former part, Alice generates and
transmits a set of raw key through the quantum chan-
nel. Due to Eve’s attacks[7], channel noise, and device
imperfection [8–10], the keys are weakly correlated and
partially secure, and Eve may obtain some information
about the keys. The classical part, also known as post-
processing, is used to correct the errors, and to remove
information leakage.
Post-processing consists of base sifting [7], error esti-
mation [6, 11, 12], key reconciliation [13] and privacy am-
plification [14, 15]. During base sifting, the bits measured
with correct measurement bases in the raw key are kept
and constitute the sifted key. Subsequently, Bob uses a
key reconciliation algorithm to correct the errors in the
sifted key based on the estimated error rate. Finally, Al-
ice and Bob implement privacy amplification to remove
information leakage and obtain the final key, which is
secure from Eve.
In error estimation, the accuracy of the estimated
quantum bit error rate(QBER) effects the operational
efficiency of post-processing. If the actual QBER for a
given block is larger than the estimate, Bob might end
up with a wrong final key. A common method to obtain
the QBER for legitimate users is to exchange and com-
pare random sampled sifted key, which can lower the key
generation rate due to disclosed bits. Recently, Kiktenko
etal [12] proposed a distinct approach based on the use of
syndromes of low-density parity-check (LDPC) codes to
obtain the QBER for each block of the sifted key, allow-
ing more accurate estimation. The suggested algorithm
is also suitable for irregular LDPC codes.
In parallel, key reconciliation is the most crucial step
of post-processing, which is responsible for correcting the
errors in Bob’s sifted key, in such a way that it ensures
consistency between Alice’s and Bob’s sifted keys. Belief
Propagation (BP) [13] is the most widely used key rec-
onciliation algorithm, and has attracted intensive study
[16–24]. There are three criteria for judging a key recon-
ciliation algorithm, namely, convergence speed, bit error
rate (BER) and success rate. However, it is hard to meet
the three criteria at the same time, which often appears
if the syndrome decoding, based on an iterative BP al-
gorithm, fails to converge within the predefined number
of iterations (e.g., it could be caused by an inappropri-
ate choice of the LDPC parity-matrices relative to the
actual errors in raw keys). This makes key reconcilia-
tion the bottleneck of QKD and severely affects the key
generation rate for industrial QKD systems.
In this paper, we extend the blind information recon-
ciliation [25] to multiple LDPC codes and estimate the
QBER more accurately by virtue of multiple syndromes
without disclosing redundant bits. Experimental results
show that a significant increase in the efficiency of the
procedure, i.e. faster convergence speed with higher suc-
cess rate. To prevent extra information leakage in our
post-processing scheme, we also give a multiple LDPC
codes construction method. Security analysis shows that
our key reconciliation scheme does not reveal extra infor-
mation.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: in Section
II, a briefly review of error estimation and key reconcil-
iation is given, followed by a detail description of the
process and advantages of our scheme. Section III pro-
vides the novel multi-matrix post-processing approach for
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2error estimation and correction. In Section IV a set of
data simulation are carried out to fully evaluate these
advantages. The proposed construction method of mul-
tiple matrices and the security analysis of the proposed
scheme are given in the appendix.
PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we will first review error estimation
and reconciliation. Other parts of post-processing can
be referred to [7, 14, 15].
Error Estimation
We assume that Alice and Bob possess random sifted
keys of equal length, and Bob needs to estimate the error
rate e of the sifted keys before executing key reconcilia-
tion, since e is an important input parameter of reconcil-
iation algorithms. The estimation accuracy of e directly
effects the operational efficiency of post-processing. If e
is overestimated, Alice will place superfluous information
on her syndrome, i.e., more leakage needed to be removed
during privacy amplification, leading to relatively low key
generation rate. On the contrary, if e is underestimated,
less information is provided, so Bob spends more time to
correct errors during key reconciliation or even end up
with wrong final key.
Error estimation can be executed in the several ways.
The most well-known method is the random sampling
[6]. But its drawback is that if Alice and Bob want to
estimate more accurate error rate, they inevitably sacri-
fice key bits. To solve this problem, P.Treeviriyanupab
et al. proposed a new method [11]. In this protocol,
Alice and Bob use their syndromes zA = [zA1 , · · · , zAm]
and zB = [zB1 , · · · , zBm] (zAj , zBj ∈ {0, 1}, j ∈ {0, · · · ,m})
as input to calculate the maximum likelihood estimation
of error rate. Syndromes are generated from a kind of
data structure, LDPC code [26], which can be presented
by a m × n matrix or a Tanner Graph (TG) [27]. In
Fig. 1 (a), an example of binary LDPC matrix Hm×n is
given. The variable nodes vi (i ∈ {1, · · · , n}) (blue circles
) and check nodes cj (j ∈ {1, · · · ,m}) (yellow squares)
represent bits of key and parity-check equations, respec-
tively [26]. TG corresponding to this matrix is shown in
Fig. 1 (b). An edge connecting a variable node and a
check node indicates that the variable node participates
in the parity-check equation. In a LDPC code, the de-
gree of a variable node (or check node) is the number of
check nodes (or variable nodes) connected to it. The syn-
dromes, zA (or zB), are simply obtained by multiplying a
LDPC matrix and Alice’s (or Bob’s) sifted key. But the
method [11] is applicable only to regular LDPC code, in
which all of the variable nodes have the same degrees and
so does all check nodes. So Kiktenko et al. extend the
Figure 1: A binary m × n LDPC matrix (a) and its
corresponding TG (b).
scope of application [12] (hereinafter referred to as the
single-syndrome error estimation), which is also suitable
for irregular LDPC code.
Key Reconciliation
BP [13], also known as the Sum Product (SP) algo-
rithm, can be used for error-correction. Due to its rel-
atively high decoding efficiency and low executing com-
plexity, BP has been widely adopted in QKD to correct
the key errors caused by Eve’s attacks, channel noise, etc.
In QKD, if Bob uses BP to correct his sifted key yT =
[y1, . . . , yn], he first needs to initializes P
b
i (b ∈ {0, 1}), vi
and variable-to-check (V2C) information Lvi→cj as fol-
lows, {
P 0i = 1− e, P 1i = e yi = 0
P 0i = e, P
1
i = 1− e yi = 1
, (1)
LPi = log
P 0i
P 1i
, (2)
Lvi→cj = LPi , (3)
where P bi (b ∈ {0, 1}) is the prior probability of the can-
didate value b of vi, e is the result of error estimation,
LPi represents the log likelihood ratio of P
b
i .
Secondly, as shown in Fig. 2 (a), he generates and
propagates check-to-variable (C2V) information Lcj→vi
by
Lcj→vi = sign(zj) · 2tanh−1(
∏
v
i
′∈N(cj)\i
tanh(
1
2
Lv
i
′→cj )),
(4)
where z denotes the Alice’s syndrome [28], which is the
product of Hm×n and Alice’s sifted key, tanh() is the hy-
perbolic tangent function, tanh−1() is the inverse func-
tion of tanh(), vi′ ∈ N(cj)\i represents the set of adja-
cent variable nodes of check nodes cj except vi, sign() is
3a sign function defined as follows:
sign(zj) =
{
+1 zj = 0
−1 zj = 1
. (5)
Thirdly, as plotted in Fig. 2 (b), Bob updates and
propagates V2C information by substituting the gener-
ated C2V information into the following equation.
Lvi→cj = LPi +
∑
c
j
′∈N(vi)\j
Lc
j
′→vi , (6)
where, cj′ ∈ N(vi)\j represents the set of adjacent check
nodes of vi except cj . All of Lcj→vi and Lvi→cj contain
information of posterior probabilities of vi.
Figure 2: (a)Generated C2V information Lcj→vi by
Alice. (b) Updated V2C information Lvi→cj by Bob.
Finally, he calculates the soft-decision value of every
variable node vi as follows,
Lvi = LPi +
∑
cj∈N(vi)
Lcj→vi , (7)
then performs the decoding decision on every variable
node according to the following equation,
yi =
{
1 Lvi > 0
0 Lvi < 0
. (8)
Bob iterates the last three steps until the decoding is
successful (i.e., the equation z = Hm×n · y is satisfied) or
the number of iterations reaches the pre-set upper limit.
In each iteration, BP can use different scheduling
strategies, which can be divided into three categories
[29]: Flooding, Shuffled, and Layer. Flooding first goes
through all the check nodes and generates C2V informa-
tion, then traverses all the variable nodes and updates
V2C information. Shuffled uses variable nodes as the
traversal sequence, sequentially updates C2V and V2C
information between variable nodes and their adjacent
check nodes. Layer, on the contrary, uses check nodes
as the traversal sequence, sequentially updates C2V and
V2C information between check nodes and their adjacent
variable nodes. In practical applications, BP, Shuffled
Belief Propagation (SBP) [17], and Layer Belief Propa-
gation (LBP) [18, 19] are the typical representatives of
the above three scheduling strategies. For convenience,
the algorithms based on single matrix are hereinafter re-
ferred to as the single-matrix reconciliation.
MULTI-MATRIX POST-PROCESSING
In this section, we propose a post-processing scheme
where users estimate error rate with multiple syndromes
and correct errors with multiple matrices (hereinafter
referred to as the multi-matrix post-processing). In
the multi-matrix post-processing, base sifting and pri-
vacy amplification are the same as the original post-
processing (hereinafter referred to as the single-matrix
post-processing). Here we introduce only error estima-
tion and key reconciliation in the frame of multiple syn-
dromes.
Multi-syndrome Error Estimation
Each bit of a syndrome represents the relationship of
the parity-check equation and the key. By comparing
Alice’s syndrome and his own syndrome, Bob can extract
some information about error rate. If he uses multiple
matrices, he can obtain multiple syndromes, which can
be used to estimate the error rate more accurately.
Above all, Bob obtains u syndromes from Alice and
performs XOR as follows,
4zk = zA|k ⊕ zB|k, k ∈ {1, · · · , u}, (9)
where ⊕ is the XOR operation, zA|k and zB|k is the kth
syndromes of Alice and Bob respectively. Then Bob cal-
culates the maximum likelihood estimation of e by,
e = arg max
e′∈[0,threshold]
Me′ |4Z , (10)
where e
′
is a possible value that e may take, 4Z =
[4z1,4z2, · · · ,4zu]. In equation (10), Me′ |4Z can be
obtained via,
Me′ |4Z =
u∏
k=1
m∏
j=1
[1−4zkj + (24zkj − 1)p(e
′
, dkcj )], (11)
4p(e
′
, dkcj ) = Pr(4zkj = 1)
=
dkcj∑
i=1
i mod 2=1
(
dkcj
i
)
e
′i(1− e′)d
k
cj
−i
,
(12)
where Me′ |4Z is the likelihood function of e
′
, p(e
′
, dkcj ) is
the priori probability of that z
A|k
j and z
B|k
j are different,
4zkj is the jth bit of 4zk, zA|kj is the jth bit of zA|k, zB|kj
is the jth bit of zB|k, dkcj is the degree of check node cj
of kth matrix. As shown in equation (10), e evaluates to
e
′
that maximizes Me′ |4Z . The “threshold” [30, 31] is
the upper limit of error rate that can be acceptable. If e
exceeds the “threshold”, the sifted key will be abandoned.
Our method (hereinafter referred to as the multi-
syndrome error estimation) is based on the single-
syndrome error estimation, but can bring out higher ac-
curacy of estimation. Meanwhile, compared with the ran-
dom sampling, our method doesn’t need to discard any
key bit.
Multi-matrix Key Reconciliation
Although, theoretical analysis and simulation results
show that the single-matrix reconciliation can correct the
errors to some extent [32], the performances of conver-
gence speed and BER are still limited [29, 33], and the
success rate is decreased when LDPC code is not cycle-
free [27, 34]. To overcome these problems, we propose a
new reconciliation strategy that uses two or more matri-
ces to correct errors in parallel. Let us take multi-matrix
BP (MBP) as an example to show the detailed process
and advantages of our strategy.
Suppose Alice and Bob have prepared and shared u
LDPC codes H1, . . . ,Hu. After obtaining the sifted key
xT = [x1, . . . , xn] (xi ∈ {0, 1}), Alice calculates u syn-
dromes according to the following equation:
(zk)T = [zk1 , . . . , z
k
n] = Hk · x, k ∈ {1, . . . , u},
zki ∈ {0, 1},
(13)
and sends them to Bob over the classical channel. Be-
cause of Eve’s attacks, channel noise, or device imper-
fection, Bob inevitably obtain different sifted keys with
Alice, denoted as yT = [y1, . . . , yn], (yi ∈ {1, 0}).
In our strategy, Bob first initializes the prior probabil-
ities P bi (b ∈ {0, 1}), log likelihood ratios LkPi and V2C
information Lkvi→cj for all matrices according to equa-
tions (1), (2) and (3), respectively.
Secondly, Bob generates and propagates C2V informa-
tion Lkcj→vi according to equation (4).
Thirdly, by substituting C2V information into equa-
tion (6), Bob updates and propagates V2C information.
Finally, he goes through all variable nodes to obtain
their soft-decision values by
Lvi = LPi +
u∑
k=1
∑
cj∈Nk(vi)
Lkcj→vi , (14)
and makes decoding decisions according to equation (8).
Because once Bob’s key is corrected, i.e. y is equal to x,
all his syndromes satisfy zk = Hk · y. Thus he randomly
selects a matrix Hk, and judges whether zk is equal to
Hk · y. If so, Bob terminates the algorithm and stores y.
Otherwise, he starts another iteration. The reconciliation
is considered as a failure when the number of iterations
exceeds the upper limit.
There is an important figure called the reconciliation
efficiency f [25]. It shows the ratio of practical informa-
tion leakage to theoretical floor for successful reconcilia-
tion. It serves to imply the efficiency and security of a
reconciliation strategy and help privacy amplification to
remove information leakage. For the single-matrix rec-
onciliation, the reconciliation efficiency f is represented
as
f =
m
nh(e)
> 1, (15)
where m and n are the numbers of check nodes and vari-
able nodes of the LDPC code, e is the result of error
estimation, h is the Shannon binary entropy:
h(e) = −e log2 e− (1− e) log2(1− e). (16)
For the multi-matrix reconciliation, however, f is given
by
f =
αm
nh(e)
> 1, (α ≥ 1), (17)
where α is a constant which is relative to u and the
structures of u matrices. Fortunately, if the construction
method of multiple matrices (see Appendix B) is used,
it can be proved that the practical information leakage
is equal to m (see Appendix A), i.e., α is equal to 1,
without sacrificing the reconciliation efficiency compared
with single-matrix post-processing.
Obviously, our strategies is portable, it can be easily
applied to SBP, LBP (see Appendix C), and other algo-
rithms to achieve the following improvements:
1. Faster Convergence Speed In our strategy, when
Bob generates C2V and updates V2C information, all
matrices operate in parallel. And as shown in equation
(14), Bob obtains the soft-decision value of each vari-
able node vi by gathering all the C2V information sent
to vi in every matrix. The amount of C2V informa-
tion gathered within one iteration in the multi-matrix
reconciliation is equal to information gathered in nu-
merous iterations in the single-matrix reconciliation.
52. Higher Success Rate Once C2V and V2C infor-
mation of a matrix are trapped in a cycle, the other
matrices without this cycle can help the trapped ma-
trix jump out the cycle, leading to higher success rate.
3. Lower BER The value of each key bit is determined
according to the information provided by multiple ma-
trices. The accuracy of error-correction is effectively
improved, resulting in lower BER.
EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
To fully evaluate the above advantages of multi-matrix
post-processing, in this session we first give some de-
tailed comparisons among three methods of error esti-
mation. Then for the other three parts, the experiments
about the three criteria of key reconciliation algorithms
are carried out. All simulation data used in our exper-
iments are generated by real random number generator
IDQ EasyQuantis 2.1. For comparison, we also set the
upper limit of iterations to 100, which is similar to exist-
ing implementations [35, 36], and the code rate and code
length of LDPC codes are set to 0.8 and 10000, respec-
tively.
Error Estimation
We have described the three methods of error es-
timation hereinbefore, including the random sampling,
the single-syndrome error estimation and the multi-
syndrome error estimation. To compare these three
methods, we generate 2000 sets of keys at error rates of
0.0068, 0.0166, and 0.0267, respectively. The sampling
rate of random sampling is set to 0.5. For any set of
key, we use these methods to get three error rates. As
shown in Fig. 3, it is clear that our method (black lines)
is more accurate and stable than the random sampling
(magenta lines) and the single-syndrome error estimation
(red lines).
Convergence Speed
For key reconciliation, since the faster the convergence
speed is, the smaller the average number of iterations
becomes, we evaluate the convergence speed of different
algorithms by calculating their average numbers of it-
erations under different error rates. We first prepare a
matrix for the single-matrix algorithms, then add four
more matrices for the multi-matrix algorithms (see the
next section for the detailed method of generating LDPC
codes). At a certain error rate, we generate 100 sets of
keys, perform each algorithm on the keys, and calculate
the average number of iterations. The results are shown
in Fig. 4. Clearly, under different error rates, the average
numbers of iterations of the multi-matrix algorithms are
significantly decreased compared with their single-matrix
versions. MBP cuts down 43.15∼46.06% of average iter-
ation number of BP, while MLBP is 38.16∼40.21% and
MSBP is 47.87∼53.38%.
We can further increase the convergence speed of the
multi-matrix algorithms by adjusting two factors. One is
the number of matrices used in reconciliation. We gener-
ate 100 sets of keys with error rate 0.0246, run the multi-
matrix algorithms with different number of matrices to
correct these keys. The relationship between the average
number of iterations and the number of matrices is plot-
ted in Fig. 5. Clearly, the average number of iterations
and the number of matrices are inversely proportional.
Another factor is the number of waves. The vari-
able nodes with larger degrees can get more informa-
tion, thus can be corrected earlier and can provide useful
information to help other variable nodes. This process
spreads from large-degree to small-degree variable nodes,
behaving like a wave, so it is called the wave effect [37].
For a multi-matrix algorithm, the multiple waves can be
formed simultaneously to correct errors. We refer this
phenomenon as the multi-wave effect, which obviously
leads to faster convergence speed. However, if the waves
are close to each other, they spread as one wave. This
greatly discounts the performance of the multi-wave ef-
fect. On the contrary, if the large-degree variable nodes
are dispersed in different matrices, the multiple waves
spread and correct errors at the same time, resulting in
faster convergence speed. We construct 5 matrices with
close waves to compare with 5 matrices with separated
ones, and plot the results in Fig. 6. Clearly, the algo-
rithms using matrices with separated waves outperform
the others.
Therefore, our strategy can significantly improve the
convergence speed compared with the single-matrix rec-
onciliation, and the speed can be further improved if Bob
uses more or designs better matrices.
Success Rate
The success rate of reconciliation may be negatively
impacted by the cycles. For example, suppose Alice’s
sifted key is xT = [1, 0, 1, 0, 1], Bob’s sifted key is yT =
[1, 0, 0, 0, 1], the error rate e is 0.2, LDPC code has 5
variable nodes labeled as {v1, . . . , v5} and 4 check nodes
denoted as {c1, . . . , c4}. As shown in Fig. 7 (a), in LDPC
code there is a 4-member cycle which is represented by
a blue circle and red edges, respectively. If Bob uses BP
algorithm to correct the key, the reconciliation is failed
in each iteration. It is because that there is always a
difference between the signs of soft-decision values of v2
and v4. Therefore, they cannot be decoded as 1 at the
same time. The 4-member cycle makes new information
6Figure 3: Comparison of random sampling, single-syndrome and multi-syndrome for error estimation with 2000 sets
of keys at the QBER of 0.0068 (top), 0.0166 (middle), and 0.0267 (bottom), respectively. (a) Results of
multi-syndrome error estimation (black lines) and random sampling method (magenta lines). (b) Results of
multi-syndrome error estimation (black lines) and single-syndrome error estimation (red lines).
Figure 4: Comparison about convergence speed of 6
reconciliation algorithms by calculating their average
numbers of iterations for different error rates.
always be excluded and old information always loop in
the cycle. Thus, as recorded in Tab. I, no matter how
large the upper limit of iterations is, the single-matrix
reconciliation always fails.
Figure 5: Relationship about the convergence speed and
the number of matrices (1∼5) in reconciliation. The
error rate for data simulation is 0.0246.
However, as shown in Fig. 7 (b), if Bob adds two ma-
trices to correct the key, since there are no cycle between
v2 and v4 in the new matrices, the data of the new ma-
trices help v2 and v4 break out of the 4-member cycle,
resulting in a successful reconciliation. As shown in Tab.
7Figure 6: The convergence speed of the multi-matrix
algorithms relative to the number of waves is shown.
We generate 100 sets of keys at each error rate, perform
each algorithm on the keys using 5 matrices with
compact and separated waves respectively, and
calculate the average number of iterations.
II, MBP correct the error within two iterations.
Figure 7: One matrix with a 4-member cycle (a) and
two additional matrices (b).
We carry out a test to fully represent the performance
of reducing the impact of cycles. In this test, we generate
1000 sets of keys with error rate 0.0275, perform the 6
reconciliation algorithms on the generated keys, and cal-
culate the success rate. As shown in Fig. 8, the average
success rate of the multi-matrix algorithms is 96.33%,
nearly double that, 48.83%, of the single-matrix algo-
rithms.
Table I: Soft-decision Values of v2 and v4
Iteration
number
Soft-decision
value of v2
Soft-decision
value of v4
Result
1 -0.753772 0.753772 fail
2 0.753772 -0.753772 fail
3 -0.728434 0.728434 fail
4 -0.728434 0.728434 fail
5 -0.704088 0.704088 fail
· · · · · · · · · · · ·
96 0.166115 -0.166115 fail
97 -0.160981 0.160981 fail
98 0.160981 -0.160981 fail
99 -0.156007 0.156007 fail
100 0.156007 -0.156007 fail
Figure 8: Reconciliation success rate for single- and
multi-matrix algorithms. 1000 sets of keys with error
rate of 0.0275 are generated for the comparison.
Bit Error Rate
Compared with the single-matrix reconciliation, the
multi-matrix algorithms decode the key according to in-
formation provided by multiple matrices. The decoding
results are more accurate and reliable. We generate 100
sets of keys with error rate 0.0267, perform BP and MBP
on the generated keys to calculate the number of cor-
rected bits Nc and the number of misjudged bits Nm in
each iteration, and plot the valid number of corrected bits
Nc − Nm in Fig. 9. We can see that MBP can correct
more errors in each iteration, and most of the errors are
corrected at the beginnings of the iterations. It achieves
faster convergence speed and lower BER compared with
BP.
To further evaluate the BER performances of the
multi-matrix algorithms, five QBER values ranging from
0.0202 to 0.0256 are selected. At each error rate, we gen-
erate 1000 sets of keys, perform 5-matrix algorithms and
their single-matrix versions on these generated keys. Af-
8Table II: Soft-decision Values of v2 and v4 in 3-matrix reconciliation
Iteration
number
Soft-
decision
value of v2
in H1
Soft-
decision
value of v2
in H2
Soft-
decision
value of v2
in H3
Soft-
decision
value of v2
Soft-
decision
value of v4
in H1
Soft-
decision
value of v4
in H2
Soft-
decision
value of v4
in H3
Soft-
decision
value of v4
Result
1 -0.753772 -0.753772 -0.753772 -5.0339 0.753772 -2.01882 -1.38629 0.121249 fail
2 0.753772 -3.46963 -2.56496 -8.0534 -0.753772 -2.77259 -3.52636 -4.28013 success
Figure 9: The valid number of corrected bits Nc −Nm
(Nc the number of corrected bits; Nm is the number of
misjudged bits) in each iteration for single- and
multi-matrix algorithms. 100 sets of keys with error
rate of 0.0267 are considered.
ter 5 iterations, we calculate BERs of different algorithms
according to the following equation,
BER =
number of error bits
1000 ∗ length of code , (18)
and draw the results in Fig. 10. It is obvious that all
three multi-matrix algorithms achieve lower BERs under
different error rates compared with their single-matrix
versions. For example, the BER of SBP is 0.0030832
when the error rate is 0.0202, while MSBP is 0.0000045,
between which there is a difference of 3-order magnitude.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, a highly efficient error reconciliation pro-
tocol for QKD is proposed, whose core is using likelihood
of multiple syndromes obtained from multiple LDPC
codes for QBER estimation and correction. Security
analysis and multi-matrix construction method are pro-
vided. Evaluation results show that the proposed ap-
proach allows improving the accuracy of QBER estima-
tion in contract to previous works. Additionally, the
scheme can greatly increase the convergence speed, suc-
cess rate, and significantly improve the BER performance
Figure 10: The BER performances of the multi-matrix
algorithms after 5 iterations are shown. Five QBER
ranging from 0.0202 to 0.0256 are selected. For each
error rate, we generate 1000 sets of keys, perform
5-matrix algorithms and single-matrix versions on these
generated keys.
during key reconciliation without compromising the rec-
onciliation efficiency and significant expenditure of au-
thentication and time resources. Our findings can lower
the complexity for post-processing procedure, thus will
promote the commercialization of QKD.
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Appendix A
Security Analysis
The security of single-matrix reconciliation is guaran-
teed by the following theorems.
Theorem 1: Let x and z be Alice’s sifted key and
syndrome, respectively. Hm×n is the matrix used in rec-
onciliation. Once Eve gets z, she can extract at most m
bits of information about x, i.e.,
I(x; z) ≤ m. (19)
Proof of Theorem: The amount of information that
Eve can obtain from z about x is
I(x; z) = H(z)−H(z|x). (20)
Assuming that Eve knows Hm×n, she would obtain z if
she knows x, i.e.,
H(z|x) = 0. (21)
When a random variables are in the equal probability
distribution, the discrete entropy can reach the maximum
value, so
I(x; z) = H(z) ≤ −
2m∑
1
(
1
2m
log
1
2m
)
= log 2m = m.
(22)
Theorem 2: If the random variable X of Alice’s sifted
key x obeys uniform distribution, i.e.,
P (X = x) =
1
2n
, (23)
then there are at least t bits of information about x un-
known to Eve, even though she has obtained z, i.e.,
H(x|z) ≥ t. (24)
where t = n−m.
Proof of Theorem: The random variable X of Alice’s
sifted key obeys uniform distribution, so
H(x) = −
2n∑
1
(
1
2n
log
1
2n
) = log 2n = n. (25)
From equations (19), (20), and (21), we derive
H(x|z) = H(x)−H(z)
= H(x)− I(x; z) ≥ n−m = t. (26)
According to Theorem 1 and Theorem 2, Eve can
get at most m bits information. Thus, if the m bits is
discarded during privacy amplification, the security of
the key can be guaranteed.
Generally, Alice and Bob can use the following method
to abandon the m bits information leakage. If the matrix
Hm×n has the following structure,
Hm×n = (H
′
m×t, Em), (27)
where H
′
m×t is a matrix which has m rows and t columns,
Em is an m-order identity matrix, then Hm×n is called
a system code. In other words, m vectors of Em are
linearly independent in Hm×n. Under this circumstance,
Alice can calculate and send the syndrome by
z = (H
′
m×t, Em) · x
= H
′
m×t ·

x1
x2
...
xt
⊕

xt+1
xt+2
...
xn
 =

z1
z2
...
zm
 .
(28)
From Theorem 1, we know that Eve can obtain at most
m bits of information about x. Assume these m bits of
information is m bits of x. And for Eve, it is in her best
interests if the m bits of x are [xt+1, · · · , xn]T . Then
Eve has to solve a underdetermined system of equation,
which has no unique solution. Moreover, after Alice and
Bob discard the m bits key [xt+1, · · · , xn]T , Eve cannot
even form the system of equation and get any information
about [x1, · · · , xt]T , even if she knows H ′m×t and z.
If the matrix Hm×n is a non-system code, a system
code can be formed by a series of elementary row trans-
formations and column exchanges based on
Hm×n = A · (H ′m×t, Em) ·B, (29)
where A is a m-order invertible square matrix represent-
ing a whole train of primary row transformation. B is
a n-order square matrix representing a series of column
exchanges. Denote z
′T
= (A−1 · z)T = [z′1, · · · , z
′
m] and
x
′T
= (B · x)T = [x′1, · · · , x
′
n], then
z
′
= (H
′
m×t, Em) · x
′
= H
′
m×t ·

x
′
1
x
′
2
...
x
′
t
⊕

x
′
t+1
x
′
t+2
...
x
′
n
 =

z
′
1
z
′
2
...
z
′
m
 .
(30)
Similarly, after Alice and Bob abandon the m bits key
[x
′
t+1, · · · , x
′
n]
T , even if Eve knows H
′
m×t and z
′
, she will
not be able to get any information about [x
′
1, · · · , x
′
t]
T .
From the above analysis, we can see that if we first
select m linearly independent columns in Hm×n, then
discard the corresponding bits of these columns, the m
bits information leakage can be removed, thus ensuring
the security of the key. Therefore, we design a multiple
matrices construction method as shown in the Appendix
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B. And all matrices used in the simulation are prepared
according to the the method.
Through the above method, we can construct a series
of matrices (H1, · · · , Hu) of the same size. Let Hi and
Hj denote any two matrices from (H1, · · · , Hu). They
can be represented as follows:
Hi = Ai · (H ′i , Em) ·Bi, (31)
Hj = Aj · (H ′j , Em) ·Bj , (32)
Their syndromes z
′i and z
′j can be represented as:
z
′i = (H
′
i , Em) · x
′i
= H
′
i ·

x
′i
1
x
′i
2
...
x
′i
t
⊕

x
′i
t+1
x
′i
t+2
...
x
′i
n
 =

z
′i
1
z
′i
2
...
z
′i
m
 ,
(33)
z
′j = (H
′
j , Em) · x
′j
= H
′
j ·

x
′j
1
x
′j
2
...
x
′j
t
⊕

x
′j
t+1
x
′j
t+2
...
x
′j
n
 =

z
′j
1
z
′j
2
...
z
′j
m
 ,
(34)
More precisely, z
′iT = (A−1i · zi)
T
= [z
′i
1 , · · · , z
′i
m],
x
′iT = (Bi · x)T = [x′i1 , · · · , x
′i
n ], z
′jT = (A−1j · zj)
T
=
[z
′j
1 , · · · , z
′j
m], and x
′jT = (Bj · x)T = [x
′j
1 , · · · , x
′j
n ].
From the above matrices construction method, we can
see that [x
′i
t+1, · · · , x
′i
n ] and [x
′j
t+1, · · · , x
′j
n ] are not equal,
but their corresponding variable nodes sets are the
same. Similarly, assume Eve knows [x
′i
t+1, · · · , x
′i
n ] and
[x
′j
t+1, · · · , x
′j
n ], then she has to solve the system of equa-
tion. Because Hi and Hj are construct with the method
in the Appendix B, the two sets of underdetermined sys-
tems of equation in equations (33) and (34) are the same.
In other word, it is impossible to form a determined or
overdetermined system of equation. After Alice and Bob
discard those m bits, even if Eve knows Hi, Hj , z
i, and
zj , she cannot obtain any information about [x
′i
1 , · · · , x
′i
t ]
and [x
′j
1 , · · · , x
′j
t ]. In fact, any two matrices constructed
by this method will not reveal extra information dur-
ing reconciliation. Accordingly, in the case of reconcilia-
tion with more than two matrices, because the discarded
m bits information is corresponding to the same m lin-
early independent columns, multiple syndromes trans-
mitted through the classical channel do not reveal extra
information, i.e.
H(zi|zi−1, · · · , z1) = 0,∀zi ∈ {z2, · · · , zu}, (35)
then we get
I(x;Z) = I(x; z1) + I(x; z2|z1) + I(x; z3|z2z1)+
· · ·+ I(x; zu|zu−1 · · · z1)
= H(z1)−H(z1|x) +H(z2|z1)−H(z2|x z1)+
· · ·+H(zu|zu−1 · · · z1)−H(zu|x zu−1 · · · z1)
= H(z1) +H(z2|z1) + · · ·+H(zu|zu−1 · · · z1)
= H(z1)
(36)
where Z = {z1, z2, · · · , zu}. Therefore, if Alice and Bob
use our method to construct matrices, they can guarantee
the security of the key, i.e., guarantee the security of the
multi-matrix post-processing.
Appendix B
Multiple Matrices Construction Method
1. The first LDPC matrix called H1 is constructed;
2. By a series of elementary row transformation and
column exchanges, H1 is transformed into a system
code, such that m linearly independent columns
can be determined. These columns correspond to
variable nodes [v(1), · · · , v(m)] in H1. Let the re-
maining variable nodes be [v[1], · · · , v[t]];
3. The rest u− 1 parity check matrices (H2, · · · , Hu)
can be constructed based on H1: First, rearrange
the columns of the variable nodes [v(1), · · · , v(m)]
in H1. Then rearrange the columns of the variable
nodes [v[1], · · · , v[t]] in H1. It’s clear that the set
of the positions of linearly independent columns, in
this way, is identical to each other for all of the u
matrices.
Appendix C
Pseudocode of MBP, MSBP and MLBP
MBP algorithm
1: Initialize Lkvi→cj = L
k
Pi
2: for every parity-check matrix Hk do
3: for j = 1 to m do
4: for every vki ∈ neighborhood of ckj do
5: Generate and propagate Lkcj→vi
6: end for
7: end for
8: for i = 1 to n do
9: for every ckj ∈ neighborhood of vki do
10: Generate and propagate Lkvi→cj
11: end for
12: end for
13: end for
14: Make decoding decisions
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15: if stopping rule is not satisfied then
16: Go back to line 2
17: end if
MSBP algorithm
1: Initialize Lkvi→cj = L
k
Pi
2: for every parity-check matrix Hk do
3: for i = 1 to n do
4: for every ckj ∈ neighborhood of vki do
5: Generate and propagate Lkcj→vi
6: end for
7: for every ckj ∈ neighborhood of vki do
8: Generate and propagate Lkvi→cj
9: end for
10: end for
11: end for
12: Make decoding decisions
13: if stopping rule is not satisfied then
14: Go back to line 2
15: end if
MLBP algorithm
1: Initialize Lkvi→cj = L
k
Pi
2: for every parity-check matrix Hk do
3: for j = 1 to m do
4: for every vki ∈ neighborhood of ckj do
5: Generate and propagate Lkcj→vi
6: for every ckl ∈
neighborhoodof vki except c
k
j do
7: Generate and propagate Lkvi→cl
8: end for
9: end for
10: end for
11: end for
12: Make decoding decisions
13: if stopping rule is not satisfied then
14: Go back to line 2
15: end if
